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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
In Pennsylvania the law seems to be more strict and limited than the law
in other jurisdictions. It certainly is more definite in its requirements and
there is apparently less room for interpretation as most cases have adhered
to the statutory interpretation as set forth by the court in Paxos v. Jarka
Corp.24 An excellent statement of the law as existing in Pennsylvania is
found in Leed v. State Workmen's Ins. Fund.25
• . . if hospital records are admissible in evidence, three probative elements
must be present: (1) They must be made contemporaneously with the acts
which they purport to relate; (2) at time of making, it was impossible to
anticipate reasons which might subsequently arise for making a false entry
in the original record; or (3) the statements or entries must be made by one
possessing knowledge of their truth; and . . . where the records of a hospital
are made not by physicians admitted to practice, but by internes or students
not qualified as experts, and there is no evidence that they were made at the
direction of the physician in charge, it is error to admit the records. 20
Illinois cases uniformly hold that if hospital records are admissible at all,
they are admissible only on the same basis that ordinary books of account
are admissible and therefore require the same manner of proof for ad-
missibility. All persons who have made entries in the record must testify
as to correctness of the entries or the record will not be admissible.
2 7
All of the cases discussing the admissibility of hospital records seem to
indicate a definite trend. There is, at the present time, no dispute as to the
admissibility of these records under the proper circumstances. Of course,
there are different statutory requirements in the various jurisdictions. The
prime point, however, is that generally these records are being admitted
and serious injustices are being prevented. Even where the records are
by statute required to be kept and are by statute specifically made ad-
missible as evidence, trial counsel must be attentive to the laying of a
proper foundation for their admission.
CIVIL RIGHTS-CLASS RELIEF DENIED ALTHOUGH
CITY'S ACTS HELD DISCRIMINATORY
Kansas City, Missouri, operates a park for the amusement and recreation
of its citizens generally. Swope Park is designed to provide a well balanced
program for athletic as well as social entertainment. Among the many at-
tractions is a swimming pool. Appellant sought to be admitted to the pool
but was refused admittance in accordance with the park commissioner's
24314 Pa. 148, 171 Ad. 468 (1934).
25 128 Pa. Sup. 572, 194 Ad. 689 (1937).
26 Ibid., at 574 and 691.
27 Monahan v. Chicago Transit Authority, 341 IIl. App. 250, 93 N.E. 2d 169 (1950);
Kimber v. Kimber, 317 Il. 561, 148 N.E. 293 (1925); Wright v. Upson, 303 1l. 120,
135 N.E. 209 (1922).
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alleged policy of restricting the use of the pool to members of the white
race. No distinction was made, however, with regard to general admission
to the park and to the use of its many other facilities. Appellant brought an
action individually and collectively for declaratory and injunctive relief
alleging discrimination and impairment of his rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. City defended on the ground that a pool was
provided for members of the Negro race located approximately six miles
from Swope Park. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the dis-
trict court granting individual relief and refusing to grant relief on a class
basis. Kansas City, Missouri v. Williams, 205 F. 2d 47 (C.A. 8th, 1953).
The court of appeals concurred with the lower court in deciding that a
journey of about six miles to and from a swimming pool of an obviously
inferior quality served to disrupt the day of recreation which appellant
had been induced to spend at Swope Park and thus the commissioner's rule
was discriminatory. The court also affirmed the denial of class relief which
was based upon the judicial discretion of the lower court even though it
expressed some degree of dissatisfaction at the narrowness of the decision.
The question of civil rights has ripened into a bitterly contested problem
in the past two decades and the instant case points up the great difficulty
which the courts are experiencing in trying to resolve these racial contro-
versies.
Class relief is a product of equity, the gist of which is to avoid impracti-
cal litigation, such as multiplicity of suits when the rights of many persons
similarly situated are involved.' The prime requisite for class relief is a
common question of law or fact.2 The lower court in denying class relief
stated that there was no evidence that any persons other than appellants
ever tendered the price of admission to the pool and hence no useful pur-
pose would be served by a decision which would be conclusive as to the
group.
In Wilson v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University,3
claimant was refused admission to the University's college of law in
accordance with a resolution handed down by the board. Louisiana had
established a college for Negroes and shortly before the controversy arose
had extended the curriculum to include law as a field of concentration.
It was predicted by the school authorities that this law school would attain
a stature second to none in the state. At the time of the suit, however, the
college was still in an early state of development. Claimant brought a per-
sonal action and one for class relief. After reviewing the comparative
1 Shipley v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R. Co., 70 F. Supp. 870 (W.D. Pa., 1947); Farmers'
Co-op. Oil Co. v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 133 F. 2d 101 (C.A. 8th, 1942).
2 Fed. Rules of Civ. Proc., 23.
392 F. Supp. 986 (E.D. La., 1950).
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worth of the two institutions and finding them greatly disparate the court
granted personal and class relief without evidence tending to show that
other Negroes had ever been refused admission because of race.
Also in Johnson v. Board of Trustees of Kentucky University,4 claimant
applied for admission to the university and was offered substituted facili-
ties in place of the facilities of the university in accord with a university
policy toward Negroes. The court decreed that claimant and all others so
qualified and situated were entitled to admission until equal or substantial-
ly equal facilities were provided by the school board. Here again there
was no evidence tending to show that other Negroes had sought admission
and were refused solely because of race or color.
It cannot be said, however, that the trial court was entirely unjustified,
on a purely legal basis, that is, in by-passing a decision on the issue of class
relief in this particular case.
In Gonzales v. Sheely5 it was the policy of the school board to segregate
all students of Spanish extraction in specially designated schools where
they could not benefit by social intercourse with children of American
habits. The court considered this discrimination and a denial of equal pro-
tection because it retarded these students in the mastery of American cus-
toms and habits and placed them on an inferior plane socially and intellec-
tually. It can be seen from the facts that the rights of the class were
crystallized. It had always been the declared policy of the school board to
segregate the students of Spanish language and custom and there was
nothing to indicate that it would ever be changed. There were other stu-
dents whose position legally was identical to the claimants. It was easy
here to delineate a class action. Comparing the Gonzales case with the
instant we find that only claimant was shown to have sought admission to
the pool and that the backbone of the class relief sought was conjecture
based upon the park commissioners' avowed policy of exclusion.
A recent decision handed down by the Alabama district court6 shows a
similar tendency to dispose of the class question by the use of subtle legal
reasoning. Claimant, a Negro, was refused registration to vote because of
race and color. He brought a representative suit in behalf of all other
Negroes in the county qualified to vote and possessing none of the dis-
qualifications enumerated by the statute. The court decided that the class
was too indefinite and reasoned that qualification to vote was essentially
personal in character and involved many imponderables which could not
be decided by one final common judgment.
This decision, as the decision in the instant case, displayed little realism
483 F. Supp. 707 (E.D. Ky., 1949).
5 96 F. Supp. 1004 (D.C. Ariz., 1951).
6 Mitchell v. Wright, 62 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Ala., 1945).
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and a decided reluctance to face the problem of racial equality that is
provided for under the Constitution. As the Louisiana court decided in
the Wilson case, the Alabama court could have recognized as a class those
Negroes qualified to vote and possessing no disqualifications.
The court in the instant case was faced with none of these technicalities
but chose to circumvent the issue under the guise of judicial discretion.
Judicial discretion is that power of the court to determine a question of
fair judicial consideration with regard to what is right and equitable under
law and circumstances and should be directed by reason and conscience to
a just result. 7 It is submitted that substantial justice was not dispensed in
the instant case. The court may have deemed it prudent to defer the class
question due to the volatile nature of the issue. However practical it may
have seemed under the existing conditions to dismiss the question, the
affirmance of the trial court's decision seems to constitute a dereliction
from that standard of equality sought to be established by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Technically the decision is not subject to reversal because
there must be a clear cut abuse of discretion above and beyond the scope
of reason."
Unless the courts cease their practice of hiding behind the veil of discre-
tionary power and bowing to local prejudices in cases involving racial
discrimination, final determination of these problems must be postponed
until such time as definitive rules are prescribed either by legislation or the
Supreme Court of the United States.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ILLINOIS PLUMBING
LICENSE LAW VOID
As citizens and taxpayers engaged in the business of selling hardware,
heating, and plumbing equipment at retail, the plaintiffs commenced an
action in the Circuit Court of Sangamon County against the defendants
who are state officers charged with enforcement of the Illinois Plumbing
License Law of 1951.1 The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants
from the expenditure of public funds in the administration of such act,
contending that the act was unconstitutional. The circuit court entered
a decree finding the statute unconstitutional as violative of the due process
clause of the state Constitution, and the due process and equal protection
7 Schneider v. Hawkins, 179 Md. 21, 16 A. 2d 861 (1941).
s Hartford Empire Co. v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 95 F. 2d 414 (C.A. 8th, 1938);
Blackhawk Motor Transit Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 383 111. 57, 48 N.E.
2d 341 (1943); In re Loeb, 315 Mass. 191, 52 N.E. 2d 37 (1943); Alford v. Alford, 190
Ga. 562, 9 S.E. 2d 895 (1940); In re Garrett's Estate, 335 Pa. 287, 6 A. 2d 858 (1939);
Benedict v. Calkins, 19 Cal. App. 2d 416, 65 P. 2d 831 (1937).
1111. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 111 , §§ 116.1-116.35.
